Multi-Party Negotiation When Agents Have Subjective Estimates of Bargaining Powers |
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Authors: | Nicolas Quérou Patrick Rio Mabel Tidball |
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Affiliation: | (1) School of Management and Economics, Queen’s University Belfast, 25 University Square, BT7 1NN Belfast, United Kingdom;(2) INRA LAMETA, 2 Place Viala, 34060 Montpellier Cédex 2, France |
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Abstract: | This paper presents a method for generating Pareto-optimal solutions in multi-party negotiations. In this iterative method, decision makers (DMs) formulate proposals that yield a minimum payoff to their opponents. Each proposal belongs to the efficient frontier, DMs try to adjust to a common one. In this setting, each DM is supposed to have a given bargaining power. More precisely each DM is supposed to have a subjective estimate of the power of the different parties. We study the convergence of the method, and provide examples where there is no possible agreement resulting from it. |
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Keywords: | adjustment procedure multi-party negotiation Pareto-optimality bargaining power |
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