首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     


Reluctant regulation
Authors:Bernardo Bortolotti  Carlo Cambini  Laura Rondi
Affiliation:1. Universita’ di Torino, Dipartimento di scienze economico-sociali e matematico-statistiche, C.so Unione Sovietica 218/bis, 10134 Torino, Italy;2. Universita’ Bocconi, Paolo Baffi Centre, Via G. Roentgen 1, 20136 Milano, Italy;3. Politecnico di Torino, DIGEP, Corso Duca degli Abruzzi 24, 10129 Torino, Italy
Abstract:We study the effect of state ownership on the market-to-book ratios of publicly traded European utilities from 1994 to 2005. We find that when the company is subject to independent regulation, state ownership seems positively associated with firm value. This relation tends to appear in countries where weak checks and balances and political fragmentation do not constrain the power of the executive. Our results suggest that, where political institutions are weak, politicians may influence regulatory agencies in order to benefit state-owned firms.
Keywords:K23   L33   L51   L90   G32
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号