The dominant senior manager and the reasonably careful, skilful, and cautious auditor

This paper examines a paradox in corporate audit history that threatens the credibility of the current audit as a means of protecting stakeholders from corrupt senior managers. Using a historical analysis of legal cases of fraudulent reporting and subsequent public accountancy responses, the study reveals the paradox of a corporate auditor denying or limiting responsibility to detect material accounting misstatement (MAM) facilitated by dominant senior managers (DSM), while relying on the honesty of senior managers. The primary finding of the legal case analysis is the persistent presence of a DSM or team of DSM in the context of various contributing features, and the creation by Victorian lawyers of a model of excuses for the corporate auditor. The primary finding from the responses of public accountants is, within the context of the model of excuses and the assumption of managerial honesty, continuous denial, or limitation of auditor responsibility for detecting MAM facilitated by DSM. The consequence of this history is that DSM intent on MAM currently face corporate auditors generally untrained to assess the audit risk of managerial domination facilitating MAM. The paper's single recommendation is that corporate auditors be educated and trained to assess the audit risk associated with DSM facilitating MAM. The paper's contribution to corporate auditing is its use of historical analysis to bring together previously known but relatively disparate matters into a coherent whole that signals a fatal flaw in existing practice.