Communication in financial markets with several informed traders |
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Authors: | Tilman Klumpp |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, Emory University, 1602 Fishburne Dr., Rich Building 316, Atlanta, GA 30322, USA |
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Abstract: | This paper investigates the incentives for informed traders in financial markets to reveal their information truthfully to
the public. In the model, a subset of traders receive noisy signals about the value of a risky asset. The signals are composed
of a directional component (“high” vs. “low”) as well as a precision component that represents the quality of the directional
component. Between trading periods, the informed agents make public announcements to the uninformed traders. With a sufficiently
large number of informed traders, an equilibrium exists in which the directional components are credibly revealed, but not
the precision components. Even though the informed traders retain some of their rivate information, the post-communication
estimate of the asset value converges in probability to the full-information estimate as the number of informed traders increases.
The paper is based on a chapter of my Ph.D. thesis at the University of Western Ontario and was circulated previously under
the title “Public Communication Devices in Financial Markets.” I thank my dissertation committee Arthur Robson, Hari Govindan,
and Al Slivinski for their guidance and support. I also thank Murali Agastya, Roland Benabou, Philippe Grégoire, Rick Harbaugh,
Mike Peters, an anonymous referee and an associate editor, and seminar participants at various universities and conferences
at which this paper was presented. |
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Keywords: | Cheap talk Communication Informational smallness Insider trading Multiple experts Market manipulation |
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