存款保险制度对银行风险承担的影响—基于跨国微观角度的实证分析

金融危机后，全球加快了存款保险制度建设的步伐，2015年5月，我国成为全球第 114个建立显性存款保险制度的国家。本文基于全球80个国家的1122家上市银行的微观数据， 研究存款保险制度对银行风险承担的影响，研究发现：存款保险制度的建立增大了个体银行的 风险承担，表现为道德风险效应。此外，本文还研究了存款保险机构性质、存款保险基金管理 方式、风险差别费率、存款保险基金来源和共同保险这5个存款保险制度设计对银行风险承担 的影响。最后根据实证结论，提出相关政策建议。。

The Impact of Deposit Insurance System on Bank Risk-Taking

After the financial crisis, the pace of the establishment of deposit insurance system has been accelerated in the world. In May 2015, China became the 114th country that established explicit deposit insurance system. Based on micro-data of 1122 listed banks in 80 countries in the world, this paper examines the impact of deposit insurance system on bank risk-taking. It finds that the deposit insurance system increases the level of bank risk-taking, which indicates moral hazard effect.In addition, this article also studies 5 characteristics deposit insurance systems and how they affect the risk-taking of bank, including the nature of deposit insurance institutions, the management of deposit insurance funds, risk differential rates, deposit insurance fund sources and mutual insurance. Finally, based on empirical findings, it puts forward some suggestion.