地理距离、契约设计与企业内部资本市场借贷风险防控——来自中国企业集团内部借贷交易的证据

地理因素对保持距离型市场交易的影响已被大量文献证实,但系统考察地理因素是否以及如何影响企业内部经济活动的研究仍十分匮乏。基于手工搜集整理的企业集团内部委托贷款这一独特数据,我们实证考察了地理距离对企业集团内部借贷契约设计的影响及相关的风险防控问题。实证结果显示,借贷距离越远,针对借款者的契约设计越严苛,不仅贷款者更可能要求借款者提供抵押担保,而且对资金用途施加限制的概率也大幅增加。进一步研究发现,与地理距离阻碍了信息搜集和监督的经济直觉一致,距离对企业内部借贷契约严苛性的推高作用会因为借贷双方之间的信息摩擦问题差异而改变。而且,基于借贷违约信息的检验结果表明,作为应对信息不对称的机制,动态调整契约严苛性这一精巧契约设计有效降低了企业内部贷款违约风险。本文不仅增进了对地理因素影响企业内部资本配置的认识,而且加深了对企业内部借贷契约设计的理解,从而对如何有效防控企业内部资本市场运作风险具有启示意义。

Geographic Distance,Contract Design and Loan Risk Prevention in Internal Capital Markets: Evidence from Intra-Group Loans in China

How geographic distance affects economic activities is an important issue. Studies have provided evidence that geographic proximity plays an important role in bank lending, venture capital investing, analyst forecasts and the stock returns of fund managers, indicating that it facilities monitoring and access to information. However, all of these findings are based on arm's-length transactions. Due to the data limitations of internal capital markets, determining the extent and mechanism of the effect of geographic distance on the loan contracts of intra-group loans is difficult. Little, if anything, is known about the prevention of loan risk in internal capital markets. In particular, China is a country with a vast territory, so firms affiliated with business groups are widely geographically distributed. In this study, we attempt to determine how geographic distance affects the loan contracts of intra-group loans. This offers insights into the behavior of lenders and borrowers in dealing with loan risk in internal capital markets, thereby developing an understanding of the micro-foundation of capital allocation in internal capital markets.The China Securities Regulation Commission requires listed firms to disclose all of their entrusted loans in official documents. Many of these entrusted loans are loans between affiliated companies within business groups, which is a typical means of capital allocation in internal capital markets. Therefore, detailed information on loan contracts and the locations of lenders and borrowers is available. We manually collect detailed information on entrusted loans, including loan terms, such as interest rate, maturity, amount, collateral and loan purpose, and defaults. Using Google Earth to identify the latitudes and longitudes of firms' addresses, we calculate the aerial distances between the geographic coordinates of affiliated companies within business groups.Using a hand-collected dataset of entrusted loans within business groups in China, we examine the effects of geographic distance on loan contracts and loan risk, focusing on the role of information. We find that contracts tend to be more restrictive when firms seek loans from remote lenders: lenders not only demand collateral, but also restrict loan purposes. Consistent with the notion that an increase in distance makes it harder for lenders to monitor borrowers and gather soft information, our results strengthen when the information friction between borrowers and lenders is greater. Furthermore, the results based on borrower default data indicate that dynamically adjusting the severity of contracts to cope with information asymmetry effectively reduces the risk of default.We contribute to both the literature on the role of geographic distance in economic activities and the literature on firms' capital allocation in internal capital markets. First, we provide direct evidence that geographic distance plays a significant role in loan contracts in internal capital markets. This means that the information collecting and monitoring associated with distance are important determinants of capital allocation in business groups. Thus, we enhance understanding of the influence of geographical distance on internal capital allocation. Second, we are the first to investigate the effect of geographic distance on intra-group loan contracts using hand-collected data on entrusted loans in internal capital markets in China. We find that loan contracts become more restrictive as the distance between borrowers and lenders increases. Furthermore, strict contractual arrangements effectively reduce loan risk. These findings shed new light on how to prevent loan risk through loan contracts. They also deepen understanding of the internal loan contract design, which is of great significance to effectively controlling operation risk in internal capital markets.