碳交易及补贴机制下供应链差别定价研究

研究了碳交易机制、补贴机制以及碳交易及补贴机制下，一个二级供应链中普通产品和低碳产品竞争的差别定价策略，通过求解Stackelberg博弈模型得出单一的补贴政策并不能激励制造商进行节能减排，应与碳交易机制结合使用，其节能减排效果优于单一的碳交易机制。最后通过一个算例分析验证了碳交易及补贴机制的有效性。研究表明：碳交易价格升高到一定程度时，普通产品的零售价批发价均升高，低碳产品的价格均下降，普通产品的销量下降，低碳产品销量上升，碳排放总量下降；随着低碳补贴的增加，普通产品的零售价，低碳产品的批发价、零售价均降低，普通产品的销量下降，低碳产品的销量上升，其中低碳产品的价格和需求量对低碳补贴的反应更加敏感，使碳排放量降低的同时还提高了制造商和零售商的利润。

Study on Differential Pricing of Supply Chain Based on Carbon Trading and Subsidy Policy

Differential pricing strategy of a two-echelon supply chain is studied under carbon trading mechanism, subsidy mechanism and carbon trading and subsidy mechanism. Ordinary products compete with low-carbon products in the supply chain. By solving the Stackelberg Game Model, it is concluded that a single subsidy policy can not encourage manufacturers to save energy and reduce emissions, but should be used in combination with carbon trading mechanism. And it is superior to the single carbon trading mechanism. Finally, the effectiveness of carbon trading and subsidy mechanism is verified by a numerical example. The research shows that when the price of carbon trading rises to a certain level, retail and wholesale prices of ordinary products will increase, the prices of low-carbon products will decrease, the demand of ordinary products will decrease, the demand of low-carbon products will increase and the total carbon emissions will decrease; with the increase of low-carbon subsidies, retail prices of ordinary products and the wholesale and retail prices of low-carbon products will decrease, the demand of ordinary products will decrease, the demand of low-carbon products will increase, and the price and demand of low-carbon products are more sensitive to the low-carbon subsidies. Higher low-carbon subsidies will reduce carbon emissions and increase the profits of manufacturers and retailers.