| Abstract: | Although corporate environmental performance (CEP) is determined by corporate governance (CG) typified by board and ownership structures, in‐depth research on stakeholder‐oriented CG is sparse. This study seeks to fill this void and promote an alternative vision of good governance. Japanese corporations have often been criticized for their stakeholder‐oriented practices such as less independent boards and the dominance of stable domestic shareholders. However, these practices are not necessarily problematic if effective monitoring mechanisms are in place. Using a database of Japanese listed corporations over 2012–2015, this study shows that both board size and composition enhance CEP, confirming the advisory function of boards. Contrastingly, foreign blockholders, who are expected to play a monitoring role, significantly constrain CEP. Japanese corporations are evolving toward a hybrid CG that aims to narrow the shareholder–stakeholder divide, and the findings will offer useful lessons for the modification of shareholder‐oriented CG. |
