Remuneration committees,shareholder dissent on CEO pay and the CEO pay–performance link |
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| Authors: | Pamela Kent Kim Kercher James Routledge |
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| Affiliation: | 1. University of Adelaide Business School, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, SA, Australia;2. Bond Business School, Bond University, Gold Coast, QLD, Australia;3. UQ Business School, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia;4. Faculty of Commerce and Management, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, Japan |
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| Abstract: | We provide evidence on whether the adoption of the full Australian Securities Exchange recommendations for remuneration committee formation and structure are associated with a lower shareholder dissenting vote or a stronger CEO pay–performance link. We find some evidence that a minority‐ and majority‐independent remuneration committee and a committee size of at least the recommended three members are associated with lower shareholder dissent. Companies with an independent committee have a stronger CEO pay–performance link. In addition, a majority‐independent committee strengthens the link between performance and growth in CEO pay. |
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| Keywords: | Remuneration Committee CEO Remuneration Shareholder Dissent |
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