Bidding in a possibly common-value auction |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Management and Strategy Department, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Rd., Evanston, IL 60208, United States;2. Department of Economics, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Rd., Evanston, IL 60208, United States;1. Beijing National Laboratory for Molecular Sciences (BNLMS), State Key Laboratory for Structural Chemistry of Unstable and Stable Species, Institute of Chemistry, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Zhongguancun, Beijing 100190, China;2. University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100049, China;3. CAS Center for Excellence in Regional Atmospheric Environment (CERAE), Institute of Urban Environment, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Xiamen 361021, China;4. State Key Laboratory of NBC Protection for Civilian, Beijing 102205, China;1. Economics Department, Diego Portales University, Avda. Santa Clara 797, Santiago, Chile;2. Center for Applied Economics, Department of Industrial Engineering, University of Chile, Beauchef 851, Santiago, Chile;1. Institute of Atmospheric Composition, Chinese Academy of Meteorological Sciences, Beijing 100081, China;2. State Key Laboratory of Severe Weather & Key Laboratory of Atmospheric Chemistry of CMA, Chinese Academy of Meteorological Sciences, Beijing 100081, China;3. Key Laboratory for Aerosol-Cloud-Precipitation of China Meteorological Administration, Nanjing University of Information Science & Technology, Nanjing 210044, China;4. Institute of Urban Meteorology, China Meteorological Administration, Beijing 100089, China;5. Environmental Meteorology Forecast Center of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, China Meteorological Administration, Beijing 100089, China |
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| Abstract: | We analyze a second-price auction with two bidders in which only one of the bidders is informed as to whether the object is valued commonly. We show that any equilibrium strategy of the bidder who is uninformed must be part of an equilibrium when both bidders instead know that the auction is not common value, regardless of the way in which the values are different. We derive sufficient conditions for equilibrium existence. |
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