Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information,abstention, and coordination in standing committees |
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| Institution: | 1. Department of Politics, New York University, 2nd Floor, 19 West 4th Street, New York, NY 10012, United States;2. Department of Economics, University of Vienna, Hohenstaufengasse 9, 1010 Vienna, Austria;3. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Øster Farimagsgade 5, 1353, Copenhagen, Denmark;1. Institute for Behavioral Genetics, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, USA;2. Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, USA;3. Departments of Biology and Psychiatry, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, USA;4. DSM Nutritional Products Biological Sciences 4, Boulder, CO, USA;1. Columbia University, United States;2. NBER, United States;3. CEPR, United Kington;4. Caltech, United States;1. College of Electronic Engineering, Guangxi Normal University, Guilin 541004,China;2. Guangxi Key Laboratory of Automatic Detecting Technology and Instruments,Guilin University of Electronic Technology, Guilin, 541004, China |
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| Abstract: | We examine abstention when voters in standing committees are asymmetrically informed and there are multiple pure-strategy equilibria – swing voter?s curse (SVC) equilibria where voters with low-quality information abstain and equilibria when all participants vote their information. When the asymmetry in information quality is large, we find that voting groups largely coordinate on the SVC equilibrium which is also Pareto optimal. However, we find that when the asymmetry in information quality is not large and the Pareto optimal equilibrium is for all to participate, significant numbers of voters with low-quality information abstain. Furthermore, we find that information asymmetry induces voters with low-quality information to coordinate on a non-equilibrium outcome. This suggests that coordination on “letting the experts” decide is a likely voting norm that sometimes validates SVC equilibrium predictions but other times does not. |
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