地方政府对国外直接投资税率竞争的博弈分析

本文采用伯川德价格竞争模型研究两个地方政府如何制定税率来竞争一个外商投资项目。分析了企业在不同地区投资的价值由公有信息和私有信息组成时,投资环境的异同对于均衡税率的影响。若投资环境同质,两地方政府税率竞争均衡时税率为零;若投资环境对企业有差异,均衡税率大于零。两种情况下的均衡税率都低于社会福利最大化时的税率水平。

Chess playing analysis of local government competition to foreign direct investment tax rate

Using Bertrand Model,this article studies how local government attract FDI by tax rate competition and the effect on equilibrium tax rate when the value of investment have both public and private information.When the two districts are identical,the equilibrium tax rate are zero; While the investment environments are different,the equilibrium tax rate is positive.However,the competitive tax rates are lower than the "best" tax rate in both cases.