| 中国地方政府主导辖区经济增长的均衡模型 |
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| 引用本文： | 李军杰,周卫峰.中国地方政府主导辖区经济增长的均衡模型[J].当代经济科学,2005,27(2):1-10,108. |
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| 作者姓名： | 李军杰 周卫峰 |
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| 作者单位： | 中国社会科学院,研究生院,政府政策系,北京,100102;中国社会科学院,研究生院,数量经济与技术经济系,北京,100102 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文分析是在下述背景下展开的:一是上下级政府间存在直接的委托代理关系;二是相对"软化"的制度约束环境;三是地方政府间竞争.基本结论是:在我国目前的制度安排下,地方政府主导辖区经济增长的最优选择是以破坏宏观经济的平稳运行和社会稳定为代价追求辖区经济的高速增长.解决问题的思路是:在"硬化"地方政府所面临的制度约束环境的基础上,重塑中央与地方政府之间的委托-代理关系,以期形成平稳和可持续的经济增长模式.
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| 关 键 词： | 地方政府 辖区经济增长 均衡模型 |
| 文章编号： | 1002-2848(2005)02-0001-10 |
The Equilibrium of Economic Growth Promoted By Local Government |
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| LI Jun-jie,ZHOU Wei-feng.The Equilibrium of Economic Growth Promoted By Local Government[J].Modern Economic Science,2005,27(2):1-10,108. |
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| Authors: | LI Jun-jie ZHOU Wei-feng |
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| Abstract: | This paper analyses the economic behavior of local government based on presuppositions of the direct principal-agent relation between upper and lower government, the soft institutional constraint, and competition among local governments. We conclude that the optimal choice of local government is to promote local economic growth by the cost of macro economic and social instability. To settle the problem, the principal-agent relation between upper and lower governments should be reconstructed based on effective institutional constraint. |
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| Keywords: | Local government Local economic growth Equilibrium model |
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