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一般需求函数下两级供应链定价博弈研究
引用本文:吴燕丰,张建同.一般需求函数下两级供应链定价博弈研究[J].上海管理科学,2011,33(6):43-47.
作者姓名:吴燕丰  张建同
作者单位:同济大学经济与管理学院,上海,200092
摘    要:研究需求函数为一般需求函数D=f(p)时,供应链中制造商和零售商不合作定价、合作定价的供应链利润。找出了两个充要条件,证明了在制造商和零售商之间不合作定价博弈存在纳什均衡时,该纳什均衡状态的供应链利润劣于合作定价的供应链利润。文中并且给出两个典型需求函数的例子:线性需求函数和柯布一道格拉斯需求函数。分别证明了它们均满足该两个充要条件,印证了所得结论。

关 键 词:分散式供应链  定价  斯坦克尔伯格博弈  一般需求函数

Game-based Pricing in a Two-echelon Supply Chain with a General Demand Function
Wu Yanfeng , Zhang Jiantong.Game-based Pricing in a Two-echelon Supply Chain with a General Demand Function[J].Shanghai Managent Science,2011,33(6):43-47.
Authors:Wu Yanfeng  Zhang Jiantong
Institution:Wu Yanfeng Zhang Jiantong
Abstract:This paper analyzed the profit difference between cooperative pricing and non-cooperative pricing in a supply chain with a general demand function. With two necessary and sufficient conditions concerning the demand function, which was identified in the paper, it was proved that the total supply chain profit of non-cooperative pricing is inferior to that of cooperative pricing if there exists a Nash equilibrium in the non-cooperative pricing game between one manufacturer and one retail in the supply chain. Two typical demand function examples were given: a linear demand function and Cobb - Douglas demand function. They both meet the two necessary and sufficient conditions, and the same conclusion, non-cooperation is inferior to cooperation, was got.
Keywords:Decentralized supply chain  Pricing  Stackelberg game  General demand function
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