由公司治理指数看经理层激励约束机制的改进

通过分析南开大学公司治理研究中心公开的中国公司治理指数数据,得出了几个结论:经理层治理水平连续三年不断提高;任免制度和执行保障的发展相对较好;只有激励约束机制表现出与经理层治理发展不匹配。并分析了我国现有的激励约束机制——年薪制、持股制和利润分享制对经理层的激励作用,发现年薪制的激励作用不明显;持股制是一种有效的长期激励策略;税前利润分享没有明显的激励作用,税后利润分享则体现了经理人员的人力资本价值,最后构建了改进的激励约束性报酬函数。

Looking at the Improvement of the Incentive and Restraint Mechanisms of the Managers from the Governance Index

This study analyses the CCGINK(China Companies Governance Index) published by Corporate Governance Research Center of Nankai University,and draws the conclusions that the level of top managers' governance continual enhanced in the past three years;appointment and removal system and executive guarantee system have developed well;but the incentive and restrictive mechanism is incompatible with the development of the top managers' governance.Through analyzing the present incentive and restrictive mechanism,yea...