地方经济增长目标与要素市场扭曲

本文采用中国2005—2017年省级政府工作报告中的经济增长目标数据,实证检验了地方经济增长目标对要素市场扭曲的影响。研究发现:(1)地方经济增长目标对要素市场具有显著的扭曲效应。通过干预信贷资源配置、扩大土地出让和压低劳动力工资等方式扭曲要素市场是地方政府实现经济增长目标的主要方式。(2)地方经济增长目标对要素市场扭曲的影响存在区域异质性。经济增长目标对要素市场的扭曲效应在中西部地区和保增长压力较大地区更为明显。(3)地方经济增长目标对要素市场扭曲的影响存在基于制度环境的门槛效应。随着金融制度、法律制度和产权制度的改善,经济增长目标对要素市场的扭曲效应将会减弱。本文为政府目标管理和要素市场扭曲等领域的研究提供了新视角,为相关政策的制定提供了重要的现实依据。

LOCAL ECONOMIC GROWTH TARGETS AND FACTOR MARKET DISTORTIONS

This paper empirically examines the impact of local economic growth targets on factor market distortions using the economic growth target data in the report on the work of the provincial government in China from 2005 to 2017. The study shows as follows: (1) Local economic growth targets have a significant distortion effect on the factor markets. Distorting the factor markets by intervening in the allocation of credit resources, expanding land transfers, and lowering labor wages are the ways that local governments use to achieve economic growth targets. (2) There is regional heterogeneity in the impact of local economic growth targets on factor market distortions. The distortion effect of economic growth targets on factor markets is more pronounced in the central and western regions and regions with greater growth pressure. (3) The impact of local economic growth targets on factor market distortions has a threshold effect based on the institutional environment. With the improvement of the financial system, legal system and property rights system, the distortion effect of economic growth targets on factor markets will weaken. This paper provides a new perspective for the study of government target management and factor market distortions, and provides an important realistic basis for the formulation of relevant policies.