学者型CEO更加自律吗?——学术经历对高管在职消费的影响

本文选取2010—2016年中国沪深A股上市公司样本,实证检验CEO学术经历对高管在职消费行为的影响。研究发现,学术经历有助于CEO强化道德自觉、增强道德自律,形成内在的自我约束与监督机制,进而抑制了其所在企业的高管在职消费活动。当CEO拥有高层次学术经历或来自内部晋升时,CEO学术经历对高管在职消费的抑制效应更为显著。该结论在采用双重差分模型、Heckman两阶段模型控制潜在的内生性问题及其他稳健性检验之后仍然成立。进一步研究表明,在自由现金流较多、董事会规模较大或独立性较低、外部审计监督较弱以及产品市场竞争程度较低等公司内外部治理环境较差的情景下,学者型CEO的自律品质所能发挥的治理作用更大,对高管在职消费的抑制效应也更为明显。此外,在党的十八大之后,随着“八项规定”等多项高压反腐政策的出台,政策效应在国有企业高管在职消费的治理中发挥着主导性作用,CEO学术经历对国有企业高管在职消费的抑制效应有所下降。本文为高管学术经历的治理效应假说提供了证据支持,对于上市公司规范和治理高管在职消费行为、选聘合适的高管人才具有重要的借鉴意义。

Are Scholar-type CEOs More Self-disciplined?The Impact of CEOs’ Academic Experience on Executive Perquisites

Executive Perquisites(perks)consumption has increasingly attracted public attentions.Existing literature mainly discuss the governance effects of various internal and external governance mechanisms of companies on executive perquisites.However,most of these studies are based on the implicit assumption that executives are homogeneous,ignoring the differences of executives' background characteristics.According to the upper echelon theory,the individual heterogeneous characteristics of senior executives(such as age,gender,education background,and work experience)shaped their cognitive values,which in turn will affect companies' decision-making.In particular,the heterogeneity of work experience can have lasting effects on executives' personal traits,thinking patterns,and values.However,no previous research investigates the effect of CEO academic experience on executive perquisites.Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed firms in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges during 2010-2016,this study examines the impact of CEOs' academic experience on executive perquisites.We find that academic experience can enhance CEO's moral consciousness and moral self-discipline,thus firms with scholar-type CEOs have lower levels of executive perquisite consumption.In addition,CEOs who obtained higher levels of academic experience can have stronger effects on perquisites.Compared with CEOs transferred from other companies,those who were promoted internally have a more significant impact on perquisites.This association is robust after a series of robustness checks,including the Difference-in-differences analysis,the Heckman two-stage model,alternative measures of executive perquisites,alternative model specification and further controlling potential omitted variables.Further analyses reveal that the negative association between CEOs' academic experience and executive perquisites is more pronounced when the firms have more free cash flows,with a larger board or fewer percentage of independent directors,with weaker external auditor monitoring,and lower degree of product market competition.The above cross-sectional analyses suggest that CEOs' academic experience can have better governance effect when the firm's internal and external monitoring mechanisms are weaker.In addition,after the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China,with the introduction of a number of high-pressure anti-corruption policies such as the“eight regulations”,the inhibiting effect of CEOs' academic experience on perquisites has declined.Our results support the governance effect of CEOs' academic experience,demonstrating that scholar-type CEOs are more self-disciplined and play a positive role in corporate governance.Theoretically,this study contributes to the literature on the upper echelons theory and determinants of perquisites consumption.This study also has strong policy implications.First,this study has implications for firms to make better decisions on executive appointments.Academic experience as an internal governance mechanism can enhance CEOs' self-discipline awareness,effectively reduce abnormal perquisites,and form a substitute relationship with internal and external monitoring mechanisms.Since that corporate governance systems are relatively weak in China,it is essential to improve the self-discipline awareness and moral consciousness of top management teams.Second,this study reveals that executives with a higher level of academic experience have a stronger effect on executive perquisites,indicating that enterprises should pay attention to the introduction of high-level talents and help them play a better demonstration effect in companies.Third,after the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China,the introduction of anti-corruption policies represented by the“Eight Provisions”effectively suppressed the executive perquisites of state-owned enterprise executives.This shows that the implementation of the anti-corruption policy is conducive to guiding the rational allocation of corporate resources,safeguarding the maximum interests of shareholders,and promoting the sustainable development of enterprises.