Explaining constitution-makers’ preferences: the cases of Estonia and the United States |
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Authors: | Ringa Raudla |
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Institution: | (1) Institute of Public Administration, Tallinn University of Technology, Akadeemia tee 3, 19086 Tallinn, Estonia |
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Abstract: | This article is concerned with the effects of the kinds of framers involved in constitution-making on the content of constitutional
provisions proposed during the drafting process. It tests the hypotheses that predict framers’ constitutional preferences
on the basis of their institutional position, partisan background and constitutional expertise with two specific cases: the
Constitutional Assembly of Estonia (1991–1992) and the Federal Convention (1787) of the United States. The case studies show
that most of the hypotheses find only partial confirmation in both instances of constitution-making. The institutional position
of a framer (being a member of existing legislature or executive) and constitutional expertise does not necessarily influence
his or her constitutional preferences in the predicted way. The only theoretical proposition that is corroborated in both
cases concerns the importance of group interest in a constitutional choice of electoral system and modes of representation:
in the Estonian case, the design of the constitutional electoral rules was strongly influenced by partisan interest; in the
US case, the interests of territorial subunits played a major role. |
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Keywords: | |
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