中国实体民资契约关系的团队效率研究

非对称信息下经济主体行为互相作用方法很多,契约理论(委托代理理论)和团队理论是上个世纪90年代至今最具有代表性的两种企业文化制度。中国实体民资中各级委托代理关系的离心效应显著,委托代理链中的团队合力效率很低,其影响因素有很多,据调查和回归分析,激励与惩罚机制的有效性、职业发展机会与空间、雇主的声誉与诚信程度、公司的规模与形象、企业的福利与社会保障是其关键。因此,作为委托方的民资企业家,为保证其积累的资本长期稳定发展,应当从代理方隐含的反博弈行为和后果出发,运用现代公司制度中的契约理论和团队精神,在短期契约中,重视奖惩制度的设计与执行;在长期和约的制定上,以利润固化和利益风险共享为准则,造就和留驻优秀的人力资本代理人队伍;公司的发展战略,应当以中长期代理雇佣契约制代替即时边际生产力决定工资的明星用人体制,消除代理链上各层知识资本员工对民营企业家的诚信、声誉、形象、福利和保障的后顾之忧,重塑新型委托代理链中的团队合作关系,实现公司内部纵横向各环节之间托代理关系的同心合力效应率。

A Study on the Team Efficiency of the Principal-agent Relationship of Chinese Entity Capital

With asymmetric information there are many ways of behavior interaction in economic entities, among which, Contract Theory （principal-Agent theory） and Team-work Theory have been the most representative enterprise culture systems since the 90s of the last century. The Centrifugal effect in the principal-agent relationship at all levels of Chinese entity capital is remarkable. The team force efficiency is very low in the principal-agent chain and there are many influence factors for that. According to the survey and regression analysis, the validity of incentive and punishment mechanism, occupation development opportunities and space, employer reputation and integrity, the company＇s scale and image, corporate welfare and social security are the key. The entrepreneurs with entity capital as the clients, in order to ensure the long-term and stable development of the accumulation of capital, should make use of the contract theory and team-work spirit in modem corporate system based on the conducts and results of the anti-game behaviors indicated by the agencies and pay attention to reward and punishment system design and imple- mentation in short-term contract. As to the long-term contract formulation, take profit curing and benefit risk sharing as the rule, produce and keep excellent human capital agent team. As for the development strategy of the enterprises, medium and long-term agent contract of employment should take the place of the star employment system in which immediate marginal productivity decides salary, thus eliminating the worries of the knowledge capital faculty for the integrity, reputation, image, welfare and security of the private entrepreneurs, reshaping team cooperation in the principal-agent chains, and making possible the consented effort effect in every link of principal-agent relationship inside the company.