Statistical manipulability of social choice functions |
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Authors: | K H Kim F W Roush |
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Institution: | (1) Mathematics Research Group, Alabama State University, 36101 Montgomery, AL, USA;(2) Mathematics Research Group, Alabama State University, 36101 Montgomery, AL, USA |
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Abstract: | We consider the proportion of profiles at which an anonymous neutral social choice function cannot be manipulated to any coalition's
advantage. We fix the number of alternatives and consider the limit as the number of individuals goes to infinity, and assume
that the limit of the fraction of all profiles in the domain is 1.
We show that there is a continuous function on “profile vectors’ which gives the maximum probability of strategy-proofness,
and that this is strictly between 0 and 1 for three alternatives. We also analyze a number of common social choice functions
along these lines. |
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Keywords: | social choice function strategy-proofness manipulability strong and exact consistency voting method balanced voting |
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