Secrecy and fairness in plea bargaining with multiple defendants |
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Authors: | Jeong-Yoo Kim |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, Kyung Hee University, 1 Hoegidong, Dongdaenumku, Seoul, 130-701, South Korea |
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Abstract: | I consider a model of plea bargaining with multiple codefendants. I mainly compare the equilibrium outcomes under joint negotiations
whereby both defendants can observe both plea offers and under separate (secret) negotiations whereby they can observe only
their own respective offer. Contrary to the widespread perceptions, the prosecutor is made worse off under secret negotiations
or at best as well off as under joint negotiations. I also discuss the implication of equilibrium offers on fairness.
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Keywords: | Plea bargaining Multiple defendants Secrecy Fairness |
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