Bank funding modes: Securitization versus deposits |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Department of Economics and Finance, University of Roma Tor Vergata, CEIS and CeFin, Italy;2. Department of Economics and Finance, University of Rome Tor Vergata, CEIS and RCEA-Rimini Fellow, Italy;3. International Monetary Fund, United States;1. Lumsa University, Rome;2. Michigan State University, Department of Economics, Marshall-Adams Hall, 486 W Circle Dr. Rm 110, East Lansing, MI 48824, USA;3. Luiss University, Rome;1. Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Carnegie-Mellon University, 50 Memorial Drive, Cambridge, MA 02142, USA;2. University of Pennsylvania and NBER, 3718 Locust Walk, 428 McNeil Building, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA |
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| Abstract: | We examine a bank's choice of whether to fund the loans it originates by emitting deposits or to sell the loans to investors. With common knowledge of loan quality and laissez faire banking, we find that the choice is irrelevant. With asymmetric information but without government intervention, we find that better quality assets will be sold (securitized) and poorer quality assets will be funded with deposits. Public regulation can influence the bank's choice; subsidies can cause a bank to favor deposit funding, but mutual funds and third-party insurers may mitigate the effects of governmental subsidies. |
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