Technology driven organizational structure of the firm |
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Authors: | René van den Brink Pieter H M Ruys |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Econometrics, Tinbergen Institute, Free University, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands;(2) Department of Econometrics and OR, CentER and TILEC, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands |
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Abstract: | We model a corporate firm with a variable internal organizational structure that adapts to various degrees of technological
cooperation. The entrepreneur determines the organizational structure that maximizes profits under participation constraints.
Wages are determined by an internal cooperative pay-system, constrained by external reservation wages. We show that closer
cooperation between production-workers results in a shorter organization with enhanced positional wages relative to the external
benchmarks. The corporate firm is embedded in a competitive market economy that determines reservation wages and market prices.
We also allow for more general technologies and provide conditions guaranteeing a finite optimal size of the firm.
We thank Rob Gilles, Dolf Talman and an anonymous referee for their comments on a previous version of this paper. |
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Keywords: | Hierarchy Organization of the firm Cooperative production Optimal firm size Positional wages Pay-system Labor complementarity |
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