When and why not to auction |
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Authors: | Colin M Campbell Dan Levin |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, Rutgers University, NJ 08854 New Brunswick, USA;(2) Department of Economics, The Ohio State University, OH 43210 Columbus, USA |
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Abstract: | Summary. Standard auctions are known to be a revenue-maximizing way to sell an object under broad conditions when buyers are symmetric and have independent private valuations. We show that when buyers have interdependent valuations, auctions may lose their advantage, even if symmetry and independence of information are maintained. In particular, simple alternative selling mechanisms that sometimes allow a buyer who does not have the highest valuation to win the object will in general increase all buyers willingness to pay, possibly enough to offset the loss to the seller of not always selling to the buyer with the greatest willingness to pay.Received: 18 June 2003, Revised: 7 September 2004, JEL Classification Numbers:
D44, D82.
Correspondence to: Colin M. CampbellWe thank Richard McLean, Dan Kovenock, two referees, and seminar participants at the University of Pittsburgh, Johns Hopkins University, Washington University, the Federal Communications Commission, the Institute for Advanced Studies at Princeton, UC-Santa Barbara, UC-Santa Cruz, and the Ohio State University Department of Finance for helpful suggestions. We thank the NSF for funding. |
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Keywords: | Auctions Posted prices Interdependencies Adverse selection |
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