The effects of incentive subjectivity and strategy communication on knowledge-sharing and extra-role behaviours |
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| Institution: | 1. School of Accounting, The University of New South Wales, NSW 2052, Australia;2. The University of Sydney Business School, NSW 2006, Australia;1. University of Nice Sophia-Antipolis, IAE de Nice, GRM (EA 4711) and INSEEC, 24 avenue des Diables Bleus, 06357 Nice Cedex 4, France;2. Department of Economics, University of Arkansas, Business Building, Room 402, Fayetteville, AR 72701-1201, USA;3. CNRS/LEM and IÉSEG School of Management, 3 rue de la Digue, 59000 Lille, France;1. The University of Sydney Business School, Australia;2. School of Accounting, UNSW Business School, UNSW Sydney, Australia;1. Warwick Business School, Aberconway Building, Colum Drive, Cardiff CF10 3EU, UK;2. Business School, Loughborough University, Ashby Road, Loughborough LE11 3TU, UK;3. College of Business, Pittsburgh State University, 1701 South Broadway Street, Pittsburgh, KS 66762, USA;4. School of Accounting and Commercial Law, Victoria University of Wellington, P.O. Box 600, Wellington, New Zealand;1. IESEG School of Management, Lille Economie et Management - CNRS, 3 rue de la Digue, 59000 Lille, France;2. University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester, CO4 3SQ, United Kingdom |
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| Abstract: | This study examines the effects of performance measurement system design on employees’ willingness to share knowledge and their general tendency to pursue extra-role behaviours. Two key design issues are examined, namely, incentive scheme subjectivity and communicating the value of human-based intangible assets through a strategy map. Using a controlled experiment we found that employees are more willing to share knowledge with a co-worker (even if it means diverting resources away from incentivised areas) under a subjective weighting scheme than a formula-based scheme. In addition, we found an interaction effect where the communication of the strategic value of human-based intangible assets increases employees’ general tendency to pursue extra-role behaviours under a subjective weighting scheme, but decreases this tendency under a formula-based scheme. Our study contributes to the performance management literature and has implications for practice by providing empirical evidence demonstrating how the design of performance measurement systems can motivate discretionary behaviours in relation to performance areas that are not recognised by the formal incentive scheme. |
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| Keywords: | Extra-role behaviours Knowledge sharing Incentive scheme Performance management systems |
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