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Tweeting identity? Ukrainian,Russian, and #Euromaidan
Institution:1. Department of Politics, New York University, United States;2. Departments of Biology and Computer Science, New York University, United States, and Simons Foundation, Simons Center for Data Analysis, United States;1. Department of Economics, KU Eichstätt-Ingolstadt, Auf der Schanz 49, 85049 Ingolstadt, Germany;2. CESifo Munich, Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 München, Germany;3. CReAM, UCL London, Department of Economics, Drayton House, 30 Gordon Street, London WC1H 0AX, UK;4. IOS Regensburg, Landshuter Str. 4, 93047 Regensburg, Germany;5. IZA Bonn, Schaumburg-Lippe-Straße 5-9, 53113 Bonn, Germany;1. Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago, United States;2. Department of Politics, NYU, United States;1. Bank of Canada, 234 Laurier Avenue West, Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0G9, Canada;2. Department of Economics, Emory University, 1602 Fishburne Dr, Rich Bldg., 3rd Floor, Atlanta, GA 30322, USA;3. University of Bradford, Faculty of Social and International Studies, Richmond Rd, Bradford, West Yorkshire, BD7 1DP, United Kingdom;4. Kyiv School of Economics, Ukraine and National Research University Higher School of Economics, 13 Yakira St., Suite 319, Kyiv, 04119, UKRAINE
Abstract:Why and when do group identities become salient? Existing scholarship has suggested that insecurity and competition over political and economic resources as well as increased perceptions of threat from the out-group tend to increase the salience of ethnic identities. Most of the work on ethnicity, however, is either experimental and deals with how people respond once identity has already been primed, is based on self-reported measures of identity, or driven by election results. In contrast, here we examine events in Ukraine from late 2013 (the beginning of the Euromaidan protests) through the end of 2014 to see if particular moments of heightened political tension led to increased identification as either “Russian” or “Ukrainian” among Ukrainian citizens. In tackling this question, we use a novel methodological approach by testing the hypothesis that those who prefer to use Ukrainian to communicate on Twitter will use Ukrainian (at the expense of Russian) following moments of heightened political awareness and those who prefer to use Russian will do the opposite. Interestingly, our primary finding in is a negative result: we do not find evidence that key political events in the Ukrainian crisis led to a reversion to the language of choice at the aggregate level, which is interesting given how much ink has been spilt on the question of the extent to which Euromaidan reflected an underlying Ukrainian vs. Russian conflict. However, we unexpectedly find that both those who prefer Russian and those who prefer Ukrainian begin using Russian with a greater frequency following the annexation of Crimea, thus contributing a whole new set of puzzles – and a method for exploring these puzzles – that can serve as a basis for future research.
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