Political structure as a legacy of indirect colonial rule: Bargaining between national governments and rural elites in Africa |
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| Institution: | 1. Economics, Griffith Business School, Griffith University, Gold Coast 4222, Australia;2. Center for Financial Econometrics, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Deakin University, Burwood 3125, Australia;3. School of Economics, Finance and Marketing, RMIT University, Australia;1. World Federation of Neurosurgical Societies, Nyon, Switzerland;2. Nanotechnology & Smart Systems, NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, California, USA;3. Northwest General Hospital and Medical Center, Peshawar, Pakistan;4. Independent cross-bench member of the House of Lords and Co-Chair, All Party Parliamentary Group on Global Health, London, United Kingdom;1. Departamento de Ingeniería de la Edificación y Producción Industrial, Universidad CEU Cardenal Herrera, San Bartolomé 55, 46115 Alfara del Patriarca (Valencia), Spain;2. Departamento de Ciencias Físicas, Matemáticas y de la Computación, Universidad CEU Cardenal Herrera, San Bartolomé 55, 46115 Alfara del Patriarca (Valencia), Spain;1. Dipartimento di Matematica, Università di Pavia and IMATI C.N.R. Pavia, Via Ferrata 1, 27100 Pavia, Italy;2. Department of Mathematics, Faculty of Education, Kyoto University of Education, 1 Fujinomori, Fukakusa, Fushimi-ku, Kyoto 612-8522, Japan;1. School of Power and Mechanical Engineering, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China;2. School of Information Engineering, Southwest University of Science and Technology, Sichuan 621010, China |
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| Abstract: | Alliances between national governments and rural elites are observed in postcolonial Africa. Governments rely on rural elites to control rural regions, guaranteeing them a degree of authority and revenue in return. This paper provides a model to analyze the forging of such alliances. Without cooperation between the national government and rural elite, the power of the two competing authorities to compel farmers’ obedience determines the revenue of the government extracted from cash crop production. Hence, with a powerful rural elite, the national government has a weak bargaining position and agrees to a large transfer to the rural elite. Furthermore, the government’s capacity to compel rural residents’ obedience is endogenously determined by the level of cash crop production and the power of rural elites. Because indirect colonial rule is a significant source of the elite control over residents in rural areas, cross-regional variations in colonial policies lead to various forms of postcolonial alliances between African national governments and rural elites. |
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