Bank ownership structure,lending corruption and the regulatory environment |
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| Institution: | 1. Université de Limoges, LAPE, Limoges, France;2. University of Birmingham, Department of Economics, Birmingham, UK;1. Department of Finance, Feng Chia University, 100 Wenhwa Road, Seatwen, Taichung 40724, Taiwan;2. Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, University of Dalat, 01 Phu Dong Thien Vuong Street, Dalat City, Lamdong, Vietnam;3. Department of Finance, National Chung Hsing University, 250 Kuo Kuang Road, Taichung 402, Taiwan;1. Moore School of Business, University of South Carolina, 1014 Greene Street, Columbia, SC 29208, United States\n;2. Wharton Financial Institutions Center, United States;3. European Banking Center, The Netherlands;4. Mays Business School, Texas A&M University, 4218 TAMU, College Station, TX 77843, United States;5. Deutsche Bundesbank, Wilhelm-Epstein-Str. 14, 60431 Frankfurt am Main, Germany;6. Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Lange Gasse 20, 90403 Nuremberg, Germany;7. Lancaster University Management School, Lancaster University, Bailrigg, LA14YX Lancaster, United Kingdom |
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| Abstract: | We empirically examine whether bank lending corruption is influenced by the ownership structure of banks, a country’s regulatory environment and its level of economic development. We find that corruption in lending is higher when state-owned banks or family-owned banks provide a higher proportion of credit to the economy, in both developed and developing countries. A stronger regulatory environment, either through a stronger supervisory regime or a higher quality of external audits, helps to curtail bank lending corruption if induced by family-controlled ownership, but not if induced by state-controlled ownership. We further find that controlled-ownership of banks by other banks contributes to reduce corruption in lending; the same applies to widely-held ownership of banks, but only for developed countries. |
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