Auctions with variable supply: Uniform price versus discriminatory |
| |
Authors: | Damian S. Damianov Johannes Gerd Becker |
| |
Affiliation: | a Department of Economics and Finance, University of Texas - Pan American, 1201 West University Drive, Edinburg, TX 78539, USA b CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zürich, Zürichbergstrasse 18, 8032 Zürich, Switzerland |
| |
Abstract: | We examine an auction in which the seller determines the supply after observing the bids. We compare the uniform price and the discriminatory auction in a setting of supply uncertainty, where uncertainty is caused by the interplay of two factors: the seller's private information about marginal cost and the seller's incentive to sell the profit-maximizing quantity, given the received bids. In every symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, bidders submit higher bids in the uniform price auction than in the discriminatory auction. In the two-bidder case, this result extends to the set of rationalizable strategies. As a consequence, we find that the uniform price auction generates a higher expected revenue for the seller and a higher trade volume. |
| |
Keywords: | Sealed bid multi-unit auctions Variable supply auctions Discriminatory and uniform price auctions Subgame perfect equilibria Rationalizable strategies |
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录! |
|