Reputation, control rights and game equilibrium |
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Authors: | Junlin Li Tianyou Li |
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Affiliation: | (1) School of Economics, Renmin University of China, Beijing, 100872, China |
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Abstract: | Using the reputation model of Kreps (1982), Vickers (1986) and Barro(1986), we develop a dynamic game model with incomplete information to examine the relations between the managers of state-owned enterprises(SOEs) in China and the government as the enterprise’s owner. Employing the model, we show that even a noncoopertive manager will not intrude the owner’s interests until the last period of his term in order to maximize his long term utility. The paper also discusses some phenomenona in state-owned enterprises in China, such as “insiders’ control”, “59 phenomenon” and excess on-the-job consumption. |
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Keywords: | reputation control rights SOEs equilibrium |
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