A Cooperative Bargaining Approach to the Assignment Market |
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Authors: | Marina Núñez Carles Rafels |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economic, Financial and Actuarial Mathematics and CREB, University of Barcelona, Av. Diagonal, 690, 08034 Barcelona, Spain |
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Abstract: | For each assignment market, an associated bargaining problem is defined and some bargaining solutions to this problem are
analyzed. For a particular choice of the disagreement point, the Nash solution and the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution coincide
and give the midpoint between the buyers-optimal core allocation and the sellers-optimal core allocation, and thus they belong
to the core. |
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Keywords: | Assignment game Core Bargaining problem Nash solution Kalai– Smorodinsky solution |
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