| 关于反商业贿赂的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 朱亚,杨文选.关于反商业贿赂的博弈分析[J].西安财经学院学报,2007,20(5):73-76. |
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| 作者姓名： | 朱亚 杨文选 |
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| 作者单位： | 西安理工大学,人文社会科学学院,陕西,西安,710054 |
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| 摘 要： | 当前的反商业贿赂机制存在着明显的缺陷,其有效性有待提高。这是制度制定、实施到变迁的不成熟性造成的,具体包括博弈参与者的监管行为、企业博弈的动力不强以及我国目前商业环境的高度不确定性等方面的因素。因此,对于反商业贿赂不完全性及其非均衡原因的分析有助于提高其效率和完善其反对机制。
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| 关 键 词： | 反商业贿赂 制度变迁 博弈均衡路径 |
| 文章编号： | 1672-2817（2007）05-0073-04 |
| 收稿时间： | 2007-04-18 |
| 修稿时间： | 2007年4月18日 |
The Game Analysis of the Anti- Commercial Bribe Mechanism |
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| ZHU Ya,YANG Wen-xuan.The Game Analysis of the Anti- Commercial Bribe Mechanism[J].Journal of Xi‘an Institute of Finance & Economics,2007,20(5):73-76. |
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| Authors: | ZHU Ya YANG Wen-xuan |
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| Abstract: | At present,there are many obvious drawbacks and shortages existing in controlling commercial bribe mechanism.And its effectiveness is to be improved.The causes are the unmaturity of institution's formulatiom,application and change including the supervision behavior of game's participation,lacking of impetus in corporatin's game and the high uncertainty of our country's present commercial environment,etc.Accordingly,the analysis of nonequilibrium reason of controlling commercial bribe mechanism is conductive to management efficiency and to improve management mechanism. |
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| Keywords: | anti-commercial bribe system change game theory equilibrium |
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