Governance Alternatives and Pricing in the U.S. Electric Power Industry

Alternative governance mechanisms can be expected to resultin differences in enterprise performance. This research analyzesthe prices charged by U.S. electric utilities using a comprehensivepricing model and a large and detailed dataset that controlsfor enterprise costs and subsidies. It finds that public ownershipis associated with significantly lower prices than with privatelyowned utilities, most likely because the latter are subjectto regulation. Also associated with lower prices are electedcommissioners (rather than those appointed by state governors),commissions with fewer members, and utilities whose governingbodies hold open meetings–all characteristics that implymore direct consumer influence on the price-determination process.Among customer groups, residential users are the biggest beneficiariesof public ownership, while industrial users appear to have moreinfluence with elected state regulatory commissions. These findingsare reconciled with theory and help explain the sometimes ambiguousresults of previous studies.