首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      


Competitive Procurement of Auditing Services with Limited Information
Authors:Monika Causholli  W Robert Knechel  Haijin Lin  David E M Sappington
Institution:1. Von Allmen School of Accountancy , University of Kentucky , Lexington , KY , USA w.knechel@warrington.ufl.edu;3. Fisher School of Accounting , University of Florida , Gainsville , FL , USA;4. Department of Accountancy , University of Houston , Houston , TX , USA;5. Department of Economics , University of Florida , Gainsville , FL , USA
Abstract:We analyse the auditing procurement process when the client is initially uncertain about her/her auditing needs and when she/he cannot discern the level of assurance provided by the auditor. The client's limited information can lead to under-auditing and substantial rent for auditors, despite the presence of ex ante competition among auditors. The information asymmetry can also make it difficult for new auditors with superior auditing technologies to displace incumbent auditors. In addition, the asymmetry can limit the incentives of auditors to improve their technologies.
Keywords:Fair value  Value relevance  Contracting  Operating assets  Economic consequences
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号