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银行挤兑模型、外部性与对策取向
引用本文:宋翠玲. 银行挤兑模型、外部性与对策取向[J]. 华东经济管理, 2007, 21(12): 136-139
作者姓名:宋翠玲
作者单位:江苏科技大学,经济管理学院,江苏,镇江,212003
摘    要:银行特定的资产负债结构强化了银行的易受挤兑性,作为典型的具有负外部性的部门,其一旦出现挤兑给各市场主体带来严重的负面影响.信息不对称是导致存款人挤兑及挤兑均衡蔓延的主因,使得存款人挤兑不仅引起存款人的损失,还会影响到其他银行,甚至影响到借款人,导致货币紧缩,经济停滞.文章采用Diamond-Dybving模型分析银行遭受挤兑的原因,指出存款人挤兑的经济金融效应,并在此基础上提出相应的对策建议.

关 键 词:信息不对称  挤兑行为  纳什均衡  信息披露
文章编号:1007-5097(2007)12-0136-04
收稿时间:2007-04-02
修稿时间:2007-04-02

Model of Depositor's Run on a Bank,Externality and the Countermeasure
SONG Cui-ling. Model of Depositor's Run on a Bank,Externality and the Countermeasure[J]. East China Economic Management, 2007, 21(12): 136-139
Authors:SONG Cui-ling
Affiliation:Economics and Management School; Jiangsu University of Science and Technology; Zhenjiang 212003; China
Abstract:The specific asset-liability structure of the bank has strengthened character of bank runs.Bank is typical sector of negative externalities,which makes the infection of depositor's run on a bank bring the serious negative effect to every main body in the market.The information asymmetry is the main reason causing spread of equilibrium of depositor's run on a bank,which make depositor's run on a bank not merely cause the depositor's losses,also influence other banks,even influence the debtor,further cause th...
Keywords:information asymmetry   behavior of depositor's run on a bank   Nash Equilibrium   disclosure of information
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