| 地方政府投资行为分析:基于委托-代理理论的视角 |
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| 引用本文： | 魏向杰. 地方政府投资行为分析:基于委托-代理理论的视角[J]. 开放导报, 2011, 0(1) |
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| 作者姓名： | 魏向杰 |
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| 作者单位： | 南京大学经济学院,江苏,南京,210093 |
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| 摘 要： | 一些地方政府的投资行为存在投资结构扭曲、短期化取向、缺乏融资约束以及政绩导向等失范现象.本文从委托一代理的视角,从信息差异、契约关系和利益结构三个方面分析地方政府投资失范的原因.据此提出解决委托-代理难题的关健在于实施有效的激励与约束.
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| 关 键 词： | 地方政府投资行为 失范 委托-代理 |
Behavioral Analysis of Local Government Investment from Trust-Agent Angle |
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| Wei Xiangjie. Behavioral Analysis of Local Government Investment from Trust-Agent Angle[J]. China Opening Herald, 2011, 0(1) |
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| Authors: | Wei Xiangjie |
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| Affiliation: | Wei Xiangjie(School of Economics Nanjing University,Nanjing Jiangsu,China,210093) |
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| Abstract: | There are distortion of investment structure,orientation of short behavior,lack of financing constraints and orientation of political performance-leading about Investment behavior of local government.This paper will analysis what has lead to the negative influence of Investment behavior of local government based on the perspective of divide digital,contractual relationship and structure of benefit from the principal-agent.So effective incentive and restraint is the key to solve the principal-agent problem. |
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| Keywords: | Investment behavior of local government the negative influence the principal-agent |
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