Bertrand vs. Cournot equilibrium with risk averse firms and cost uncertainty |
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Authors: | Harrison Cheng |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Economics, University of Southern California, University Park, Los Angeles, CA, 90089-0253, USA (e-mail: hacheng@usc.edu) , US |
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Abstract: | Summary. In an oligopoly game with cost uncertainty and risk averse firms, we show that Bertrand and Cournot equilibrium have different convergence properties when the market is replicated. The Cournot equilibrium price converges to the competitive price. Under very typical and somewhat general conditions, the highest Bertrand equilibrium price converges to one higher than the competitive equilibrium. We also give examples to show how to compute the limit of the highest Bertrand equilibrium prices and illustrate the ideas of the proof. We explore conditions under which the supply curve is upward sloping, a useful condition for our results. Received: April 20, 2000; revised version: May 10, 2001 |
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Keywords: | and Phrases: Market size Bertrand competition Cournot competition risk averse firms Cost uncertainty. |
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