公司购并利益相关者的利益均衡吗?——基于公司购并动因的风险溢价套利分析

本文利用信息经济学与博弈论理论 ,从公司利益相关者的利益均衡角度对公司购并进行动态博弈分析。为刻画行为主体利益动态均衡过程 ,论文应用Rubinstein讨价还价模型 ,揭示公司购并过程中利益均衡及其对公司购并的推动作用。为解开“购并公司股东损益之谜” ,论文引进购并公司信息占优条件下的风险套利模型 ,分析购并公司溢价购并损失在市场背后的风险套利补偿。在此基础上 ,采用市场分析法对上市公司购并利益分配进行实证 ,检验结果显示中国证券市场同样存在“购并公司股东损益之谜”。

Does the Stakeholders' Benefit of Merger and Acquisition Become Equilibrium?

The thesis applies the economics of information and game theory, establishes a dynamic game of M&A to analyze the stakeholders' benefit equilibrium. In order to describe the process of behavioral subject's dynamic benefit equilibrium, we apply Rubinstein's offer-counteroffer model to explore the benefit equilibrium and its motive function in the process of M&A. For the sake of explanation “the shareholders' equity loss puzzle”, we apply the risk arbitrage model under information advantage to bidding firms, to analysis the risk arbitrage compensation behind the stock market for the loss of the bidding firms' premium expenditure. Based on these principles, we apply market analysis to have an empirical study on benefit allocation of the listed companies' M&A, the results reveal that it also exits “the shareholders' equity loss puzzle” in China stock market.