Mechanism design goes to war: peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types |
| |
Authors: | Mark Fey Kristopher W Ramsay |
| |
Institution: | (1) Department of Political Science, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY, USA;(2) Department of Politics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA |
| |
Abstract: | In this paper, we consider the possibility of identifying peaceful mechanisms such as bargaining protocols, international
institutions, or norms that can enable countries to settle disputes in the absence of binding contracts. In particular, we
are interested in the existence of mechanisms with zero probability of war. Here, we focus on situations where the countries’
payoffs to war are interdependent or correlated and where efficient settlements are not required but subsidies are unavailable.
Most importantly, countries can choose to go to war at any time and can use information learned from the negotiation process
in making this choice. We characterize the conditions under which no peaceful mechanisms exist and discuss how weakening our
war consistency condition can change this result.
We thank Massimo Morelli, Adam Meirowitz, Hein Goemans and two anonymous reviewers for helpful advice and comments and John
Duggan and Dan Bernhardt for encouraging this direction of inquiry. |
| |
Keywords: | Conflict War Private information Mechanism design War consistency |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|