A note on van Damme's mechanism |
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Authors: | Elisabeth Naeve-Steinweg |
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Affiliation: | (1) Institute of Mathematical Economics, University of Bielefeld, P.O. Box 100131, D-33501 Bielefeld, Germany , DE |
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Abstract: | We consider (two-person) bargaining games and we assume that the agents want to apply two possibly different bargaining solutions. A mechanism is a function which assigns an allocation to every bargaining game and every pair of bargaining solutions. Examining van Damme's mechanism (1986) from a cooperative point of view we see that it fails to satisfy Pareto-optimality. By modifying it we propose a new mechanism yielding the same conclusions as the original while enjoying some additional desirable properties. Received: 8 August 1998 / Accepted: 15 October 1998 |
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Keywords: | JEL classification:C72 C78 |
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