不对称信息条件下高校教师激励机制的契约分析

本文运用契约经济学的研究方法对不对称信息条件下高校教师的激励机制设计进行了分析，发现学校对教师的激励机制能否取得最佳效果取决于教师能力、风险厌恶程度，工作结果的不确定性以及教师对进修学习成本承担的比例。研究发现利用”标尺竞争”原理改进后的激励契约可以进一步提高对教师的激励强度，降低学校的代理成本。最后本文对高校教师激励机制设计给出一些具体的建议。

An Analysis of Incentive Contract for University Teachers under the Asymmetric Information

Using the contract theory,the paper dis- cusses an incentive model in the university with asymmetric information.The study finds the effect of incentive is closely related to the teacher's working ability,the degree of risk a- verse,uncertainty of the work and study cost.The study finds that the yardstick competition may improve the incen- tive contract.Finally,we give some advice about the Chinese college motivation mechanism by utilizing the result of the paper.