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A Non-cooperative Approach to Bankruptcy Problems |
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| Authors: | Ignacio García-Jurado Julio González-Díaz Antonio Villar |
| Institution: | (1) IDEGA & Department of Statistics and OR, University of Santiago de Compostela, 15782 Santiago de Compostela, Spain;(2) Department of Statistics and OR, University of Santiago de Compostela, 15782 Santiago de Compostela, Spain;(3) University of Alicante & Ivie, Alicante, Spain |
| Abstract: | We propose an elementary game form that allows to obtain the allocations proposed by any acceptable bankruptcy rule as the unique payoff vector of the corresponding Nash equilibria. |
| Keywords: | Bankruptcy Non-cooperative games Nash equilibrium Strong equilibrium |
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