| 基于个体理性的水资源需求与节约的博弈分析 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 张林刚,严广乐.基于个体理性的水资源需求与节约的博弈分析[J].水资源保护,2006,22(6):95-98. |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 张林刚 严广乐 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 上海理工大学管理学院,上海,200093 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 明确水资源是一种“池塘资源”,而不是纯公共资源,也不是私人资源,水资源的开采具有排他性和竞争性。应用简单的博弈模型分析理性个体的行为特点,提出在产权关系不明确、政府缺乏激励机制的情况下,水资源会出现开采过度和节约不足现象。
|
| 关 键 词： | 池塘资源 公地悲剧 博弈分析 水资源 |
| 文章编号： | 1004-6933（2006）06-0095-04 |
| 收稿时间： | 2005-03-17 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005年3月17日 |
Game-theoretic analysis of demand and saving of water resources based on individual rationality |
| |
| ZHANG Lin-gang,YAN Guang-le.Game-theoretic analysis of demand and saving of water resources based on individual rationality[J].Water Resources Protection,2006,22(6):95-98. |
| |
| Authors: | ZHANG Lin-gang YAN Guang-le |
| |
| Institution: | School of Management, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, Shanghai 200093, China |
| |
| Abstract: | Water resources are characterized as 'pool resources' rather than pure common resources or private resources.Based on this principle,the exploitation of water resources has the character of exclusivism and rivalrousness.The simple game theoretic model was used to analyze the characteristics of individual behavior.The result indicates that water resources will be exploited excessively and saved insufficiently when the property rights are undefined and the government encouraging mechanism is absent. |
| |
| Keywords: | pool resources the tragedy of the commons game theoretic analysis water resources |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
| 点击此处可从《水资源保护》浏览原始摘要信息 |
| 点击此处可从《水资源保护》下载免费的PDF全文 |
