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信贷审批权配置效率的实证分析
引用本文:程迅,付明明.信贷审批权配置效率的实证分析[J].技术经济,2006,25(9):100-103.
作者姓名:程迅  付明明
作者单位:浙江大学,经济学院,杭州,310027;浙江省金融工作领导小组办公室,杭州,310025
摘    要:运用Bankscope全球银行与金融机构分析数据库,实证分析了银行信贷审批权的配置对银行经营绩效的影响。研究发现,银行信贷审批权限对其经营绩效没有显著影响。这意味着信贷审批权的上收并不一定会改进银行经营绩效。银行把信贷审批权上收,虽然可以在一定程度上减少代理人的道德风险,降低代理成本,但是银行信息成本可能会增加。因此,银行在进行贷款审批权的配置时需要综合考虑代理成本和信息成本.不应该搞“一刀切”,一味地把信贷审批权上收。

关 键 词:信贷  审批权  效率  实证
文章编号:1002-980X(2006)09-0100-04
收稿时间:05 16 2006 12:00AM
修稿时间:2006年5月16日

Empirical Analysis of the Efficiency of Credit Screening Power Allocation
CHENG Xun,FU Ming-ming.Empirical Analysis of the Efficiency of Credit Screening Power Allocation[J].Technology Economics,2006,25(9):100-103.
Authors:CHENG Xun  FU Ming-ming
Institution:1 .College of Economy, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310027; 2 Zhejiang Financial Affairs Office, Hangzhou 310025
Abstract:By using the database of Bankscope,this paper analyses empirically the influence of credit screening power allocation on banks' performance. It finds that the bank's credit screening power has no significant effects on its performance. This means that the concentration of credit screening power can't always improve the bank's performance. Although by concentrating its credit screening power,the bank can to a degree decrease the agents' moral hazard and reduce agent cost,but the bank's information cost will increase. Therefore,when a bank allocates its credit screening power,it should consider both agent cost and information cost,not blindly concentrating its credit screening power.
Keywords:credit  screening  efficiency  empirical
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