公共品单向外溢下地方政府间演化博弈——以跨区域水资源生态补偿为例

水资源作为典型的公共品具有很强的外溢性,而且其外溢性具有单向流动的特征,围绕水资源生态补偿引发的流域上下游地方政府间矛盾日益突显.基于演化博弈理论,分析我国跨区域上下游地方政府的博弈过程以及影响因素.研究表明,流域上下游地方政府达成合作的局面长期内主要受上游地方政府惩罚值、下游地方政府惩罚值、下游地方政府对上游地方政府的补偿收益以及上游地方政府保护水资源的成本等四个方面因素影响,而与下游地方政府因水资源受到保护而获得生态收益无关.高层级政府解决水资源补偿问题时,不能仅考虑下游地方政府获得生态收益,而应该综合考虑上游地方政府惩罚值、下游地方政府惩罚值、下游地方政府对上游地方政府的补偿收益以及上游地方政府保护水资源的成本等多方面因素.

Evolutionary Game Theory between Local Governments under Single Direction Spillover of Public Goods: A Case Study of the Water Resouce Ecological Compensation across Regions

As typical public goods, the water resource has typical spillover feature, and its spillover is toward single direction. The contradiction about the ecological compensation of water resource between upstream and downstream local governments becomes more and more intense. Based on the evolutionary game theory, the paper analyses the game activities and factors that influence the activities. The result shows that the factors that influence if upstream and downstream local governments can come to an agreement are punishment quantity of upstream and downstream local governments, ecological compensation of downstream government to upstream local government, and cost of upstream local governments. To solve the issue of water resource ecological compensation, high-level government should pay more attention to these four factors besides the benefit of downstream government from water resource protection.