| 产品市场竞争、管理层权力与薪酬辩护 |
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| 引用本文： | 王东清,刘艳辉. 产品市场竞争、管理层权力与薪酬辩护[J]. 财经理论与实践, 2016, 0(4): 105-110. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1003-7217.2016.04.016 |
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| 作者姓名： | 王东清 刘艳辉 |
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| 作者单位： | 中南大学 商学院,湖南 长沙,410083 |
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| 摘 要： | 以2011~2014年我国 A 股上市公司为研究样本，基于薪酬辩护的视角，考察管理层权力对薪酬—业绩敏感性的影响以及产品市场竞争的监督约束作用。实证结果表明，企业高管利用手中权力获取超额薪酬、谋取私利的同时，会通过提升薪酬—业绩敏感性为自身薪酬进行辩护，形成薪酬契约合理有效的表象；产品市场竞争能够显著抑制企业高管的薪酬辩护行为，降低管理层权力对薪酬契约的影响和扭曲。
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| 关 键 词： | 管理层权力 超额薪酬 薪酬-业绩敏感性 薪酬辩护 产品市场竞争 |
Product Market Competition, Managerial Power and Compensation Justification |
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| WANG Dongqing,LIU Yanhui. Product Market Competition, Managerial Power and Compensation Justification[J]. The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics, 2016, 0(4): 105-110. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1003-7217.2016.04.016 |
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| Authors: | WANG Dongqing LIU Yanhui |
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| Affiliation: | (Business School, Central South University, Changsha410083, China) |
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| Abstract: | Based on the samples of listed companies in China from 201 1 to 2014,this paper in-vestigates the impact of managerial power on pay for performance sensitivity and the impact of su-pervision under product market competition from the perspective of compensation justification. The main empirical results indicate that when corporate top managers use their power to get ex-cess compensation and seek their own interests,they will also increase the pay for performance sensitivity to justify the reasonability of compensation,and present a reasonable and effective compensation contract.Product market competition can inhibit top managers'behavior of compen-sation justification significantly,and then reduce the impact and distortion on compensation con-tract under managerial power. |
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| Keywords: | Managerial power Excess compensation Pay for performance sensitivity Com-pensation justification Product market competition |
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