| 大股东控制、掏空与投资者保护 |
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| 引用本文： | 梁欢.大股东控制、掏空与投资者保护[J].特区经济,2010(11):127-128. |
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| 作者姓名： | 梁欢 |
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| 作者单位： | 天津财经大学经济学院,天津300222 |
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| 摘 要： | 大股东的"掏空"行为侵占了中小股东的利益,如何防范与治理控股股东的"掏空"行为已成为市场关注的焦点。本文引述了"掏空"行为的两种表现形式,并分析了"掏空"行为产生的原因,最后在此基础上提出了几点对策和建议。
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| 关 键 词： | 大股东 公司治理 掏空行为 投资者保护 |
Substantial shareholder control,hollow and investor protection |
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| Liang Huan.Substantial shareholder control,hollow and investor protection[J].Special Zone Economy,2010(11):127-128. |
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| Authors: | Liang Huan |
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| Abstract: | The Tunneling behavior of controlling sha reholder deprive the minority stock-holders of their benefits,how to control and the tunneling behavior of controlling shareholder have become the focus of the market.This paper quotes two performing forms of the tunneling behavior,and analyzes reasons which generate the tunneling behavior of controlling shareholder,fainally puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions. |
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| Keywords: | Controlling stock-holder Tunneling behav ior Corporate governance invstor protection |
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