Signaling via an agenda in multi-issue bargaining with incomplete information |
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| Authors: | Lutz-Alexander Busch Ignatius J Horstmann |
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| Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3G1, CANADA, CA;(2) Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario N6A 5C2, CANADA, CA;(3) Institute for Policy Analysis, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario M5S 3G6, CANADA, CA |
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| Abstract: | Summary. While actual bargaining features many issues and decision making on the order in which issues are negotiated and resolved,
the typical models of bargaining do not. Instead, they have either a single issue or many issues resolved in some fixed order,
typically simultaneously. This paper shows that, when there is incomplete information, such an approach removes an important
avenue for information transmission: the bargaining agenda itself. Compared to the standard model, pooling on offers by the
informed is reduced and a signaling equilibrium arises when the agenda is determined endogenously. Signaling is carried out
by use of an issue-by-issue bargaining agenda.
Received: September 3, 1997; revised version: May 11, 1998 |
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| Keywords: | and Phrases: Multi-issue bargaining Agenda bargaining Incomplete information Signaling |
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