Shareholder wealth effects of CalPERS' activism |
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| Institution: | 1. Curtin University, Australia;2. Università Iuav di Venezia, Italy;1. School of Energy Research, Xiamen University, Xiamen 361005, China;2. Business School, East China Normal University, 500 Dongchuan Road, Shanghai 200241, China;3. Collaborative Innovation Center for Energy Economics and Energy Policy, Xiamen University, Xiamen 361005, China;4. China Center for Energy Economics Research, School of Economics, Xiamen University, Xiamen 361005, China;1. Department of Civil Engineering, Federal University of Ouro Preto, Ouro Preto, Brazil;2. Department of Civil Engineering, Federal University of Ceará, Fortaleza, Brazil |
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| Abstract: | In the past decade, institutional investors have become more active in monitoring management and voting the shares they control. The California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS) was a leader in this wave of activism. This study investigates the long-term returns an investor with public information could earn by buying a portfolio of firms targeted by CalPERS and whether the success of CalPERS' activism depends on the aggressiveness of the targeting. The evidence supports the idea that visible and aggressive activism leads to substantial increases in shareholder wealth while a quieter activism does not. |
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