An ideal Kyoto protocol: emissions trading, redistributive transfers and global participation |
| |
| Authors: | Caplan Arthur J; Cornes Richard C; Silva Emilson C D |
| |
| Institution: |  Department of Economics, Utah State University
 School of Economics, University of Nottingham
 Department of Economics, Tulane University, New Orleans, LA 70118–5698, USA and Catholic University of Brasilia; emilson{at}tulane.edu |
| |
| Abstract: | We demonstrate that an interregional policy scheme featuringtrading of carbon dioxide emissions, redistributive resourcetransfers and global participation, a scheme which we call ‘IdealKyoto Protocol’, yields an efficient equilibrium allocationfor a global economy. An altruistic international agency—say,the Global Environment Facility—should operate the resourcetransfer mechanism. In addition, regional governments shouldbe able to make independent policy commitments regarding howto control regional emissions of carbon dioxide in anticipationof the redistributive transfers. Our efficiency result suggeststhat the USA should be ‘bribed’ to reverse its decisionof not participating in the Kyoto Protocol. |
| |
| Keywords: | |
| 本文献已被 Oxford 等数据库收录！ |
|
